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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
generated great controversy and received virulent criticism from peo-
ple on both sides of the constitutional debate. The Court's analysis
attempts to delineate the boundaries between religion and secular
society, raising fundamental questions about the role of religion in
the lives of individuals and in the public sphere. Such constitutional
determinations strike at the very core of the American identity, poten-
tially jeopardizing long-held traditions. Furthermore, these issues beg
metaphysical questions about the definition of "religion" and the role
of both religion and history in the evaluation of potentially unconsti-
tutional practices. As part of this legal challenge, the Supreme Court
has engaged in the controversial task of ascertaining whether seem-
ingly religious practices and symbols are in fact religious, or whether
history and collective experience have purged them of their religious
significance.
By distinguishing practices that are religious from those that
"have lost any true religious significance,"1 the Court has engaged in a
"secularization" of religious practices and symbols. Examples include
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state-sponsored religious displays2 and invocations of God in the
Pledge of Allegiance and other national mottoes.3 Although secular-
izing religious practices conveniently preserves the inclusion of sym-
bols and practices that many Americans understand as fundamental
to American identity, it also threatens the purity and integrity of both
government and religion. In addition, such strained legal justifica-
tion jeopardizes the historically neutral relationship between religion
and the state.
The Court's adoption of this type of fact-specific inquiry also pre-
sents a larger and more daunting question: What is at stake in defin-
ing a given practice as either truly religious or secularized by time and
tradition? This Comment explores the motivations behind the secu-
larizing of religious symbols and practices, as well as the implications
of sanctioning those symbols and practices with legal authority, and
argues for an alternative analysis.
Part I of this Comment provides a background of traditional Su-
preme Court Establishment Clause analysis. Part II describes recent
changes in Establishment Clause analysis, particularly the seculariza-
tion of religious practices. It discusses the foundations of this trend
and analyzes several examples, including the secularization of relig-
ious practices and symbols in two contexts: public displays and na-
tional invocations of religion. In addition, Part II critiques the logic
of the Court's secularization analysis, arguing that the Court's ration-
alization is both inadequate and spurious. Part III examines the aca-
demic notion of "civil religion," a concept that has been embraced by
the Supreme Court in its efforts to justify secularization of religion.
Part IV discusses the detrimental effects of the Court's secularization
of religious practices and symbols, and considers the ways in which
secularization injures religion, society, and the individual. Part V
suggests a theory for why the Court continues to embark on its mis-
sion-in spite of the conspicuous perils that accompany seculariza-
2 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (upholding display of
Chanukah menorah on municipal property); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) (upholding display of a municipally sponsored cr&he).
' See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602-03 (assuming that while a creche might be unconsti-
tutional, the Pledge of Allegiance is obviously distinguishable); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676
(citing the Pledge and "In God We Trust" as examples of constitutionally permissible
references to our national heritage); see also School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (speculating that"under
God" in the Pledge is merely an allusion to a "historical fact"); Sherman v. Community
Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting challenge to the
constitutionality of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance).
[Vol. 146: 579
1998] THE SUPREME COURT'S SECULARIZATIONANALYSIS 581
tion-and how the damage can be minimized. In particular, this Part
argues that the persistent compulsion to retain religious practices and
symbols in public life is due, in part, to a collective crisis of American
identity and attendant fears of an evolving identity that excludes relig-
ion. Finally, this Comment argues for a repudiation of the Supreme
Court's secularization analysis and a return to a faithful Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
I. TRADITIONAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause4 analysis has been at-
tacked by commentators from all sides of the constitutional and relig-
ious debate since the Supreme Court embarked on its first attempts
to articulate a coherent doctrine." Criticism of the Court's analysis
has focused on recent decisions that specifically delineate which prac-
tices are truly religious and therefore violate the Constitution.6 How-
ever, the Court's ambivalence about the appropriate role of religion
in public life, as well as the proper means for analyzing such issues,
has been apparent since its earliest decisions.
In its original incarnation, the Supreme Court's church and state
doctrine appeared to be certain and resolute. In Everson v. Board of
Education, the Court upheld a New Jersey statute that provided for
reimbursement to parents for costs of transporting children to public
or parochial schools. 7 The Court reasoned that, although parents of
4 The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DIsBELIEF 109 (1993) ("The embarrass-
ing truth is that the Establishment Clause has no theory."); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 220 (2d rev. ed. 1994) ("The Supreme Court has been inex-
cusably inconsistent in its interpretation of the establishment clause."); William P.
Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and Establishment 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 495, 495 (1986) ("From the outset it has been painfully clear that logical consis-
tency and establishment clause jurisprudence were to have little in common.").
6 See, e.g., LEO PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE, AND THE BURGER COURT 124 (1984)
(arguing that the Court's treatment of religious minorities in Lynch is similar to its
treatment of racial minorities in the Dred Scott decision); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitu-
tional Calculus: EqualJustice orEconomicEfficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 610-11 (1985)
(noting that the Court's finding in Lynch, that any endorsement of religion was merely
"incidental" and could not outweigh the "secular" function of celebrating the holiday
season, was similar to the finding that there was "nothing invidious" in Jim Crow laws);
Irving R. Kaufman, Where Christmas Belongs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1991, at A15 (noting
the dangers associated with allowing the Court to determine the religiousness of prac-
tices and speculating on the dire consequences of "this misguided substitution of
assigned roles-jurist as spiritual mentor, legislator as itinerant preacher").
7 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
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students attending parochial school were eligible for assistance, the
program did not aid religion.8 In spite of the specific holding, the
Court stated a firm and unambiguous prohibition of church and state
integration:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all relig-
ions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influ-
ence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbe-
liefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount.., can be levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organi-
zations or groups and vice versa.9
In addition to articulating an emphatically separationist policy, the
Court specifically stated that the First Amendment (and therefore the
Establishment Clause) applied to both the federal government and
the states. 0 Invoking Thomas Jefferson's concept of a "wall of separa-
tion between church and state,"" the Court maintained that the "wall
must be kept high and impregnable," 2 apparently leaving little room
for future debate.
In spite of its auspicious beginning, the Supreme Court's church
and state doctrine later became equivocal, uncertain, and fiercely
contested. Although the principle of neutrality developed in Everson
prevailed in the decades following the decision, the concept was con-
stantly reinterpreted and manipulated.'3 Over time, the Court's opin-
ions adopted various analyses yielding unpredictable results, 4 and its
8The Court determined that the program "does no more than provide a general
program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and
expeditiously to and from accredited schools." Id. at 18.
9 Id. at 15-16.
10 See id. at 15.
" Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting
Jefferson)).
12 Id. at 18.
's See Timothy L. Hall, Sacred Solemnity: Civic Prayer, Civil Communion, and the Estab-
lishment Claus4 79 IoWA L. REv. 35, 37 (1993) ("[T]he concept of neutrality dwells at
an elevated level of abstraction and is susceptible to manipulation from a wide spec-
trum of perspectives.").
14 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (subjecting a chal-
lenged law or practice to a three-part test); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690
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consensus on mandatory and absolute separation of church and state
as expressed in Everson dissolved.' Until 1971, when the Supreme
Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman and announced a formal test for
practices and laws challenged under the Establishment Clause,16 the
Court's decisions relied on a somewhat ad hoc methodology.
According to the Lemon test, a practice or law does not violate the
Establishment Clause if it has a valid secular purpose, does not have a
primary effect that either advances or inhibits religion, and does not
create excessive entanglement of government and religion.17  Al-
though the Lemon test seems to provide sufficient guidance, it has
failed in two important respects. First, the rule has not garnered the
necessary support from the Court' 8 Second, it provides no guidance
for determining when a challenged practice or symbol is sufficiently
"religious" to trigger rigorous Establishment Clause analysis. Al-
though the formal rule articulated in Lemon has survived, the rule is
of limited value, as it does not provide a vehicle for assessing relig-
iousness and is not uniformly applied.19 Thus, the determination of
how and when practices violate the Constitution has evolved as a
nebulous and highly subjective process.
II. THE SECULARIZATION OF RELIGION
In the absence of a systematic means for ascertaining when a chal-
lenged practice is sufficiently nonreligious to survive Establishment
Clause analysis, the Supreme Court has determined religiousness on a
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the appropriate inquiry was whether
a challenged practice or statute endorsed religion); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592
(1992) (stating that the relevant question was whether the challenged practice w.as
coercive).
1- CompareLee, 505 U.S. at 599 (striking down a school graduation prayer), with id.
at 642-44 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and White & Thomas, S., dissenting)
(arguing that school-sponsored graduation prayer did not violate the Establishment
Clause).
16 403 U.S. at 612.
17 See id. at 612-13.
Is See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White &
Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that the Lemon test is irrelevant and suggesting that
the majority opinion had properly ignored the test); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 636-40 (1987) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (criticizing the "purpose" prong of the Lemon
test); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concur-
ring) (criticizing the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test).
'9 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (declining to apply the
Lemon test to the Nebraska state legislature's practice of opening each session with a
prayer).
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case-by-case basis. This Part of the Comment demonstrates how the
Court has secularized religious practices by discussing several exam-
ples. In addition, this Part critiques the logic of Supreme Court secu-
larization.
"Secularization," as it is used in this Comment, refers to the Su-
preme Court's determination that practices and symbols which were
once religious have lost their religious significance, through either
temporal or contextual erosion. A determination of the true relig-
iousness of contested practices and symbols has not been consistently
subjected to Establishment Clause analysis. Rather, the analysis has
been selectively employed in an attempt to reconcile religion with
tradition.2 ' The standard may be whether a symbol or practice has
achieved a threshold level of status in American history and tradition.
One commentator speculated that "[t]he comfort of familiarity and
the desire for continuity with the past explain continued use of the
symbol better than devotion to the content of its meaning."M1  The
explanation that such practices and invocations are of a national
rather than religious significance2 reveals a fundamental and deep-
seeded attachment: To outlaw such practices would be somehow "un-
American."
Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984) (holding that a creche has
a secular purpose of depicting history and tradition), and Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795
(upholding daily public prayer by a chaplain employed by the Nebraska state legisla-
ture), with School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963)
(striking down a Pennsylvania law that required Bible readings in public school at the
opening of each school day). As one critic noted: "The Court has failed to offer a
principled justification for holdings that banished civic prayers from public
schools ... but permitted civic prayers in state legislative assemblies .... " Hall, supra
note 13, at 41.
21 Hall, supra note 13, at 50.
See, e.g., Smith v. Denny, 280 F. Supp. 651, 653-54 (E.D. Cal. 1968) (rejecting a
challenge to the Pledge of Allegiance, and quoting Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766,
774 (D. Ariz. 1963), in which a challenge to mandatory participation in singing the
National Anthem was struck down because "[t]he singing of the National Anthem is
not a religious but a patriotic ceremony, intended to inspire devotion to and love of
country. Any religious references therein are incidental and expressive only of the
faith which as a matter of historical fact has inspired the growth of the nation."); cf.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[W]e have simply interwoven the
motto ["In God We Trust"] so deeply into the fabric of our civil polity that its present
use may well not present that type of involvement which the First Amendment prohib-
its.").
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A. Secularization in Practice
Either by design or as a byproduct of constitutional reasoning,
secularization has preserved traditional practices in several different
contexts, including public displays and national invocations. How-
ever, even prior to invoking secularization as a justification for pre-
serving religious practices and symbols, the Court expressed its
predisposition to sanction some religious practices. These early cases
revealed a commitment to historical tradition and a willingness to
creatively preserve religious practices in spite of obvious conflicts with
the Establishment Clause. In the later cases, the Supreme Court and
courts of appeals have carried this inclination a step further by classi-
fying practices and symbols as secular.24
1. A Precursor to Secularization-Deifying History
In Marsh v. Chambers, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Cir-
cuit and held that recitation of nondenominational prayers at the
opening of the Nebraska state legislature by a Presbyterian minister
did not violate the Establishment Clause.2 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the Nebraska legislature's prac-
tice was not unconstitutional because it was well grounded in United
States history: "The opening of sessions of legislative and other de-
liberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history
and tradition of this country."2 6 The majority opinion traced the
practice back to 1774 when the Continental Congress opened its ses-
sions with a prayer delivered by a paid chaplain.7 Although the Bill
of Rights had not been drafted at that time, the Marsh opinion noted
the 1789 passage of the First Amendment as evidence that the exist-
ing practice of employing legislative chaplains was not in conflict with
' See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 (holding that a creche has the secular purpose of
depicting history and tradition); cf. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (upholding legislative
prayer as a "part of the fabric of our society").
24 See, e.g., Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th
Cir. 1992) (describing the Pledge of Allegiance as a secular rather than a sectarian
vow).
463 U.S. at 795. Although the Court called the prayers "Judeo-Christian," id. at
793, they were often explicitly Christian in nature. For example, on March 20, 1978,
the Chaplain gave the following invocation: "Father in heaven, the suffering and
death of your son brought life to the whole world moving our hearts to praise your
glory. The power of the cross reveals your concern for the world and the wonder of
Christ crucified." Id. at 823 n.2 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 786.
2 See id. at 787.
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the Establishment Clause: "Clearly the men who wrote the First
Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains
and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for the prac-
tice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without interrup-
tion ever since that early session of Congress." 28 The Court assumed
that the incongruity was recognized and reconciled by Congress when
it was adopted: "[T]he Senate reasoned that since prayer was said by
the very Congress that adopted the Bill of Rights, the Founding Fa-
thers could not have intended the First Amendment to forbid legisla-
tive prayer or viewed prayer as a step toward an established church."2
The Marsh majority's reasoning relied on the weight of history,
tradition, and original intent. The opinion conceded that history was
not mandatory authority for contemporary adjudication, but argued
that the actions of the Framers should be accorded more weight than
mere historical authority:
Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary vio-
lations of constitutional guarantees, but there is far more here than
simply historical patterns. In this context, historical evidence sheds light
not only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to
mean, but also on how they thought that Clause applied to the practice
authorized by the First Congress--their actions reveal their intent. An
Act "passed by the first Congress assembled under the Constitution,
many of whose members had taken part in framing that instru-
ment. ... is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true mean-
ing. s
By assuming that original intent was properly inferred and inter-
preted by the first Congresses, the Marsh Court avoided the burden of
further analysis.
The majority assessed the actual practice of legislative prayer, but
determined that no feature violated the Establishment Clause since
32each was consistent with historical tradition. Although the Eighth
Circuit had objected to the governmental selection of a clergy mem-
ber from a single denomination,35 the Supreme Court remained un-
troubled by a potential endorsement of a single religion: "We cannot,
2 Id at 788.
29 Id. at 789 n.10.
" Id at 790 (omission in original) (quoting Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S.
265, 297 (1888)).
31 Although the majority noted that the Eighth Circuit applied the Lemon analysis,
it declined to do the same. See id. at 786.
32 See id. at 793-94.
See Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 146:579
1998] THE SUPREME COURT'S SECULARIZATIONANALYSIS 587
any more than Members of the Congresses of this century, perceive
any suggestion that choosing a clergyman of one denomination ad-
vances the beliefs of a particular church."4 In addition, the Court
held that compensating a chaplain with federal tax dollars did not
violate the First Amendment, since that "remuneration is grounded
in historic practice." 5 In spite of the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence that had evolved from Everson to Lemon, the
Court in Marsh declined the opportunity to apply modem tests and
relied instead on historical tradition.
The Marsh opinion is significant for several reasons, particularly
as it impacts on the Court's practice of secularization. First, the opin-
ion is clear evidence that the Court is willing to look beyond the lan-
guage of the Establishment Clause in order to ascertain whether or
not practices are constitutional. In addition, and perhaps more sig-
nificantly, the opinion indicates the degree to which the Supreme
Court understands certain religious practices and symbols to be inte-
gral to American history and tradition. In the contexts of public dis-
plays and national invocations, the Court invokes the weight of
history. But history, in these later opinions, has a dual function. It is
employed as evidence of original intent, as in Marsh, and it is under-
stood as a vehicle for altering the religiousness of certain practices
and symbols.
2. Secularization-Public Displays
During the 1980s, the Supreme Court decided Lynch v. Donnelly?
and County of Allegheny v. ACLU,37 applying theories of secularization
in both decisions. In Lynch, the Court reversed the First Circuit and
held that a creche, a three dimensional representation of the birth of
Christ, erected by the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, as part of a
display also featuring a Santa Claus, a Christmas tree, and a "Seasons
Greetings" sign, did not violate the Establishment Clause.a3 The Lynch
Court relied heavily on history and tradition in holding that the
creche, displayed on government property, was not sufficiently relig-
ious to violate the Establishment Clause. The Court applied the
' Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793.
id. at 794.
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
-, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.
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Lemon test, and found that, "in the context of the Christmas season, 3 9
the creche fulfilled the valid secular purpose of celebrating the holi-
day.4" Furthermore, any benefit to a specific faith, or to religion in
general, was remote or incidental, and therefore did not advance
religion.4' In addition, the creche created no administrative entan-
glement since the government did not consult church authorities in
assembling the display,42 nor did it spend a consequential amount of
money maintaining the display.4
Although the Court applied the Lemon test to the facts of Lynch,
each prong of the test was analyzed in light of history and tradition.4
Thus, in the context of the Christmas display, the creche was not suf-
ficiently religious to violate any prong of the Lemon test.4 Further-
more, the Court analyzed the creche relative to other religious
symbols and practices-both those unchallenged and those previously
upheld-and found that invalidating the creche would be inconsis-
tent with social norms:
It would be ironic, however, if the inclusion of a single symbol of a par-
ticular historic religious event, as part of a celebration acknowledged in
the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people,
by the Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for 2 centu-
ries, would so "taint" the city's exhibit as to render it violative of the Es-
tablishment Clause. To forbid the use of this one passive symbol-the
creche-at the very time people are taking note of the season with
Christmas hymns and carols in public schools and other public places,
and while the Congress and legislatures open sessions with prayers by
s Id. at 679.
40 See id. at 676 (noting that Christmas was recognized as a national holiday and,
therefore, its celebration was sufficiently secular). Justice O'Connor wrote a separate
concurring opinion advocating an endorsement standard which would inquire
whether a reasonable observer would interpret the creche as a government endorse-
ment of religion. In light of the context of the display,Justice O'Connor argued that a
reasonable observer would not perceive the creche as an endorsement of any particu-
lar religion, or of religion over irreligion. See id. at 690-94 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
4' See id. at 683. Again, the Court relied on the congressional recognition of
Christmas as a national holiday to hold that the creche did not advance religion any
more "than the Congressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday
itself, as 'Christ's Mass,' or the exhibition of literally hundreds of religious paintings in
governmentally supported museums." Id.
"' See id. at 684. The Court did not reach the issue of whether the creche caused
entanglement through political divisiveness since divisiveness was no longer sufficient
to establish entanglement. See id. at 684-85.
43 See id. at 684 (noting the de minimis value of the "tangible material" of the
crfche).
14 See id. at 674-78.
41 See id. at 685.
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paid chaplains, would be a stilted overreaction contrary to our history
and to our holdings.46
The opinion explicitly rested its holding on the finding that holi-
day creches are no more or less palatable than many other religious
symbols. 47 Thus, the Court declined the opportunity to assess the
creche independent of the existence of other types of potentially vio-
lative symbols. Indeed, the Court seemed to fear that invalidating the
creche would jeopardize other commonly accepted symbols and prac-
tices, and the opinion implied that the Court was unprepared to em-
bark on such a politically unattractive task. The majority opinion
cautioned that "[i]f the presence of the creche in this display violates
the Establishment Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note
of Christmas, and of our religious heritage, are equally offensive to
the Constitution."4" The hesitation expressed by the Court is not un-
warranted: Many other practices and symbols would be jeopardized if
the Court had held that the creche violated the Establishment Clause.
Though this would present a daunting task for courts, it is an unsatis-
fying justification for upholding the constitutionality of otherwise
violative practices and symbols.
The Court considered the constitutionality of public displays
again in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,49 but under significantly different
factual circumstances than in Lynch. In Allegheny, the City of Pitts-
burgh allowed a creche to be placed on the Grand Staircase of the
Allegheny County Courthouse, and a menorah, a candelabrum which
is used as part of the Jewish festival of Chanukah, to be erected out-
side the City-County Building. The creche was donated by a Roman
Catholic group. A sign posted with the display indicated its sponsor,
and a banner read "Gloria in Excelsis Deo!"0 No other holiday para-
phernalia accompanied the creche. In contrast, the menorah was
part of a larger display, including a Christmas tree and a sign declar-
ing the city's "salute to liberty."5s There was no consensus in the Alle-
gheny decision regarding either the appropriate method of analysis or
the constitutionality of the creche and the menorah.
6 Id. at 686.
47 See id. at 685-86.
'sdM at 686.
49 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
0 Id. at 580 ("Glory to God in the Highest").
51 Id. at 582.
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The Court held that the creche violated the Establishment
Clause, but the display of the menorah was constitutional. 2 Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and
O'Connor, applied the endorsement standard articulated by Justice
O'Connor in Lynch, in which she defined impermissible endorsement
as any government message that may be perceived as favoring adher-
ents or excluding nonadherents from the political community.5 3 The
Court held that the Establishment Clause forbids "government from
appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from
'making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community.'"4 Furthermore, the Court em-
phasized that the endorsement inquiry necessarily requires evaluation
of the context of a challenged practice or symbol.55 The Court in
Allegheny found that, in contrast to the context of the creche in Lynch,
because the creche at the Pittsburgh Courthouse stood alone, without
secular symbols or messages, it was likely to be perceived as an en-
dorsement of religion:s "Here, unlike in Lynch, nothing in the con-
text of the display detracts from the creche's religious message....
[I] t is the single element of the display on the Grand Staircase."
5 7
The opinion distinguished the secular acknowledgment of Christmas
allowed in Lynch from a truly Christian celebration, reiterating that
the former was permissible but providing little explanation for this
apparent logical incongruity.-
The five Justices holding that the creche violated the Establish-
ment Clause divided on the constitutionality of the menorah. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens believed that the menorah also failed
52 See id. at 579 (plurality opinion).
s' See id. at 592-95.
Id. at 594 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
" See id. at 598 ("[Nlothing in the context of the display detracts from the crtche's
religious message."); see also id. at 595 (plurality opinion) ("[Wlhether the govern-
ment's use of an object with religious meaning has the effect of endorsing religion....
turns upon the context in which the contested object appears .... ").
16 The Court noted that the cr&he was accompanied by several poinsettia plants.
However, the Court found that rather than conveying a secular message, the plants
merely created a frame around the cr&he. The flowers "serve [d] only to draw one's
attention to the message inside the frame." Id. at 599.
17 Id. at 598.
See id. at 601 ("The government may acknowledge Christmas as a cultural phe-
nomenon, but under the First Amendment it may not observe it as a Christian holy
day by suggesting that people praise God for the birth ofJesus.").
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the endorsement test 9 However, Justices Blackmun and O'Connor
upheld the menorah under the endorsement test and achieved a
majority for this holding by gaining the support of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy. The latter four
Justices rejected the endorsement test and found both the creche and
the menorah constitutional by applying a less rigorous inquiry.60 In-
deed, the result reached by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor seems
incongruous: How could the crche offend the Establishment Clause
while the menorah did not? Although Justice Blackmun's opinion
conceded that a menorah is a religious symbol, the context of the
display was sufficient to assuage fears that a reasonable observer
would perceive it as an endorsement of religion. According to Justice
Blackmun, "[t]he necessary result of placing a menorah next to a
Christmas tree is to create an 'overall holiday setting' that represents
both Christmas and Chanukah-two holidays, not one." M He ex-
plained that because both holidays were being celebrated as "secular
holidays," the menorah did not violate the Establishment Clause.62
Furthermore, Justices Blackmun and O'Connor supported their in-
terpretation by arguing that the banner saluting liberty which accom-
panied the menorah neutralized any potential religious message.6 As
in Lynch, context transformed the religious symbol into a secular ob-
ject.
The lack of consensus among the Justices, as well as the seemingly
inconsistent results of Lynch and Allegheny, make it difficult to distill
any coherent rule from these cases. Yet the opinions do stand for one
discernible proposition: Where a practice or symbol is perceived as
integral to American culture, or where the context of a display which
59 See id. at 637 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disputing the notion that the display of
the menorah "shows no favoritism towards Christianity, Judaism, or both").
'0 See id. at 679 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part) (arguing that
"we have no jurisdiction over matters of taste within the realm of constitutionally
permissible discretion").
6' Id. at 614 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692
(1984) (O'ConnorJ., concurring)).
12 Id. at 615 (plurality opinion). According to Justice Blackmun, Christmas trees
are not religious symbols and therefore do not offend the Establishment Clause: "The
Christmas tree, unlike the menorah, is not itself a religious symbol. Although Christ-
mas trees once carried religious connotations, today they typify the secular celebration
of Christmas." Id. at 616 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 619 (plurality opinion). The banner read: "During this holiday season,
the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the
keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom." Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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includes religious articles creates an impression of mere holiday cele-
bration or religious pluralism, the symbols will be recharacterized as
secular.
3. Secularization-National Invocations
The Supreme Court has also participated in the secularization of
religious references in national mottoes and recitations with little
hesitation. Indeed, Court opinions have supported more controver-
sial instances of secularization by referencing the commonly accepted
invocation of religious sentiments in the Pledge of Allegiance or on
coins.64 This type of invocation rarely has been challenged, and the
Supreme Court has declined to review such cases that have reached
the courts of appeals. 6
Federal courts of appeals have adopted the Supreme Court's lan-
guage of secularization, upholding the invocation of religious symbols
and practices by the state. 6 In Sherman v. Community Consolidated
School District 21, the Seventh Circuit held that the recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance by teachers and willing students did not violate
the Establishment Clause, in spite of the language "under God."
67
Employing the same reliance on history and original intent adopted
by the Supreme Court in the public prayer and display cases, the Sev-
enth Circuit reasoned that because the Framers engaged in public
invocations of religious terms and symbols, they must not have con-
templated such uses as an "establishment" of religion. 68 Furthermore,
rA See cases cited supra note 3.
6' See, e.g., Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 508 U.S. 950 (1993),
denying cert. to 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992) (allowing recitation of the Pledge of Alle-
giance in a public school as long as students were free not to participate).
See, e.g., Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
declaration of Good Friday as a public holiday in Hawaii did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause).
"7 980 F.2d at 439. The Supreme Court previously had held that compulsory avow-
als of faith to any religious or national symbol were unconstitutional. See West Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("[N]o official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."). In
Sherman, the Seventh Circuit held that the Pledge itself did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause, despite possible pressure to participate on students who chose to remain
silent. See980 F.2d at 443-44.
See Sherman, 980 F.2d at 445-46 ("James Madison... issued presidential procla-
mations of religious fasting and thanksgiving. Thomas Jefferson, who refused on
separationist grounds to issue thanksgiving proclamations, nonetheless signed treaties
sending ministers to the Indians." (footnote omitted)).
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the court unequivocally distinguished this type of reference from the
one prohibited by the Supreme Court in Allegheny, stating that "'there
is an obvious distinction between cr&he displays and references to
God in the motto and the pledge."' Although this distinction may
be obvious to the court of appeals, such a conclusory statement does
not provide any meaningful explanation. Is such a distinction be-
tween a representation of the birth of Christ and a profession of alle-
giance to "one nation under God" obvious to school children or to
atheists?
Cases legitimizing public displays and national invocations of re-
ligion rely, to varying degrees, on the proposition that religiousness is
a contextual label: Whether a symbol or practice is religious depends
on context and history. Symbols and practices which were at one
time religious can lose their religious significance (for purposes of
constitutional analysis) when surrounded by nonreligious items or
when consistently included in national celebrations over the course of
history. According to this theory, history, time, and culture somehow
diminish or erase the religious import of practices and symbols which
continue to be used and invoked by religion.
B. Critiquing the Logic of Secularization Analysis
The secularization of religious practices and symbols by the Su-
preme Court, followed by lower courts, has become a customary
means of preserving religious references that the general public (or
at least the courts) find agreeable. However, the reasoning employed
in these opinions, and their heavy reliance on history, are problem-
atic. While historical practice is often examined in constitutional
adjudication, it has limited relevance in the Establishment Clause
context.
69 Id. at 447-48 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989)).
Many separationist scholars also subscribe to this distinction. See, e.g., Kenneth L.
Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV.
C.R-C.L. L. REV. 503, 520-21 (1992) (asserting that references to God in this context
are acceptable under any foreseeable Establishment Clause analysis); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 207-08 n.59 (1992)
("Rote recitation of God's name is easily distinguished as a de minimis endorsement in
comparison with prayer or the seasonal invocation of sacred symbols.").
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1. The Limited Relevance of History
Judges often rely on history in constitutional jurisprudence. In
the current context, however, the Court carries historical analysis a
step further by asserting that endurance results in an epistemological
transformation. This reasoning relies on the assumption that mere
longevity alters the meaning of such invocations. As one scholar has
noted, this logic renders "the Establishment Clause unintelligible by
substituting historical citation for principled adjudication." 7' By privi-
leging history over contemporary legal reasoning, the Court eviscer-
ates the potency of the Establishment Clause as a protection of both
church and state.
As many critics of the Marsh decision have noted, Establishment
Clause analyses constructed on arguments about original intent are
dubious. 7' Even assuming that history is sufficient to dictate modem
jurisprudence, the Court's reliance on the rationale and behavior of
eighteenth-century lawmakers is misplaced.7 The meaning and pur-
pose of the Establishment Clause have changed with the social evolu-
tion of the nation. Furthermore, the circumstances under which the
religion clauses were adopted indicate that the Clauses emerged in
response to particular local concerns and were included in the First
Amendment at the insistence of local-rather than congressional-
70 Hall, supra note 13, at 47.
7' See, e.g., id.; Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the
Public Church, 81 CAL. L. REV. 293, 307 (1993) (describing the Court's reliance on
history in Marsh as a "poor" method "because it sheds no light on the meaning of, or
principle behind, the Establishment clause"); Yehuda Mirsky, Civil Religion and the
Establishment Clause 95 YALE LJ. 1237, 1245-46 (1986) (criticizing the Marsh decision as
"unprincipled").
Whether or not original intent is a valid and determinative means of interpret-
ing the religion clauses, the Supreme Court should not merely study the behavior of
the First Congress. As Professor Hall argues, the Constitution itself is "godless," giving
"some indication that the Framers treated normal politics differently from constitu-
tional politics and that we should not rush to make normal politics the divining rod
for discerning constitutional meaning." Hall, supra note 13, at 49; see also ISAAC
KRAMNiCK & 1K LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION 26-45 (1996)
(chronicling the debates after the omission of God in the Constitution); LEO PFEFFER,
CHURCH AND STATE FREEDOM 240 (rev. ed. 1967) (noting that the omission of refer-
ence to God in the Constitution was intentional rather than inadvertant and, thus,
should certainly not be cited as a reason for holding governmental invocations consti-
tutional).
7s See THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 198-99 (1986) ("Just getting elected to
Congress had proved difficult for [Madison].... Once elected, however,
Madison... informed the House that he considered himself 'bound in honor and in
duty' to present and advocate amendments.").
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activists who feared intrasect discrimination. 74 The First Amendment
thus was adopted with little anticipation of its implications when in-
terpreted by the courts: "When the First Congress debated various
versions of the present First Amendment, they focused on style rather
than substance and never inquired how the amendment would affect
particular controversies."n In light of the context of the adoption of
the Establishment Clause, it seems unreasonable to infer that mem-
bers of the First Congress recognized the incongruity of their actions
with the recently passed Amendments. One scholar compares the
practices of the First Congress with those of the Reconstruction Con-
gress:
The willingness of the First Congress to have President Washington fa-
cilitate a prayerful republic should no more control the meaning of the
Establishment Clause than the willingness of the Reconstruction Con-
gress to educate black children in segregated and inferior schools
should control the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
In both cases, lawmakers introduced a new principle within constitu-
tional discourse. They did not ponder the varied ways in which that
principle might work out in practice .... 76
Current reliance on the actions of the Framers imputes to them a
degree of awareness and conscience that most likely did not exist at
the time.
2. Misapplication of History
In addition to creating results which probably were unintended
by the Framers, dependence on historical practice is thoroughly in-
adequate to address contemporary conflicts of church and state.
Secularization analysis cites history not only as evidence of original
intent, but also as an essential element for expunging religious im-
port. In order to assert comfortably that a practice has "lost its relig-
ious significance,"77 however, the Court assumes a level of
understanding and familiarity with American culture that many citi-
zens and visitors do not possess. Indeed, a child reciting the Pledge
of Allegiance for the first time probably does not have the requisite
historical knowledge to understand that swearing an oath to "one
nation under God" is not a pronouncement of religious faith. Fur-
7' See id. at 189 (describing the fears of Virginia Baptists).
7 Hall, supra note 13, at 48.
76 Id. (footnote omitted).
77 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675 (1984).
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thermore, it is inappropriate for the Court to function in this way, as
an arbiter of cultural semiotics. As the ultimate interpreter of the
secular law, the Supreme Court should not undertake the delicate
task of ascertaining whether the presence of a life-size plastic Santa
Claus mitigates the religiousness of a three-dimensional representa-
tion of the birth ofJesus Christ.
Historical longevity does not adequately justify the Supreme
Court's attempts to expunge religion from practices and symbols
once commonly acknowledged as religious. Yet the Court is not
alone in its efforts to legitimize a marriage of church and state in
religious displays, public prayer, and national invocations. As dis-
cussed in Part III, many scholars also strive to preserve religion in the
public sphere, relying on the concept of "civil religion" to explain and
justify secularization.
III. AMERiCAN CIVIL RELIGION
The concept and language of secularization was not created by
the Supreme Court, but was adapted from academic discourse and
the notion of "civil religion." Sociologist Robert Bellah first articu-
lated the concept of civil religion as a collection of values, ideals,
symbols, and rituals derived from common experience which unify
people in loosely affiliated social structures.5 Since its introduction,
however, the concept of civil religion has been reinterpreted, and
many modem scholars now understand civil religion to include ele-
ments of sacral religion, forming a set of secular and religious norms
universally accepted in American society.7 As this Part will demon-
strate, Supreme Court church and state doctrine has continually in-
voked notions derived from civil religion, particularly in the
secularization of religious symbols and practices. 0 However, the Su-
78 See Robert N. Bellah, Civic Religion in America, 96 D.DALus 1, 5 (1967)
(describing the development of the notion of civil religion).
79 See, e.g., Will Herberg, America's Civil Religion: What It Is and Whence It Comes, in
AMERICAN CIvIL RELIGION 76, 76-77 (Russell E. Richey & Donald G. Jones eds., 1974)
(describing the existence of common values); Maddigan, supra note 71, at 304
(suggesting that the Court has wrongly disregarded sociological effects of religion on
Americans); Mirsky, supra note 71, at 1239 (arguing that the Supreme Court should
acknowledge America's civil religion).
8o See generally County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (allowing some
religious displays on the ground that the symbols are secular in context); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a city erecting a crache did not violate the
Constitution); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that opening state
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preme Court has been capricious in its references to civil religion;
although Court opinions have alluded to vague notions of civil relig-
ion, none have discussed the doctrinal or social implications of em-
ploying it as support for secularization.
A. Defining Civil Religion
1. The Incarnation of Civil Religion
Civil religion is generally understood as a natural compilation of
"values, symbols, rituals and metaphysical assumptions"" that evolved
as a societal response to the chaos and lack of social order associated
with the advent of modernity.82 Bellah understood the emergence of
civil religion as a means of achieving social order in a society that was
undergoing rapid change. As one scholar explains, "[b]y developing
and nurturing civil religions the members of modern societies at-
tempt to recapture some of the lost, organic solidarity of pre-modern
societies by linking political ideas and institutions, naturally shared by
all, with a network of hallowed meanings. "ss According to this theory,
civil religion provides a secular set of norms and values formerly
shared by a society that was homogeneous and united religiously,
economically, and socially.
Although civil religion as it was initially envisioned by Bellah was
derived in part from elements of traditional theistic religions,84 the
compilation of the ideas, values, symbols, and rituals is political rather
than sacral."' Bellah conceived of civil religion as a social structure
16
fully distinct from religion, although many elements of American
civil religion were derived from Puritanism and the Jewish and Chris-
tian traditions.8 7 Furthermore, Bellah's civil religion does not attempt
legislative sessions with a Christian prayer by a chaplain does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause).
a' Mirsky, supra note 71, at 1248 (citing Bellah, supra note 78, at 1).
12 See id. at 1249.
sId. at 1250.
'4 See id. at 1248.
See id. at 1249.
See Bellah, supra note 78, at 1 (describing civil religion as existing "alongside of
and rather clearly differentiated from the churches"); see also Deborah K. Hepler, The
Constitutional Challenge toAmerican Civil Religion, KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1996, at
93,96.
87 SeeMirsky, supra note 71, at 1251.
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to usurp the explicative and didactic functions of sacral religions."8
Rather, it unites citizens, regardless of their religious convictions, in a
structure which is ultimately political. Significantly, it is "free of over-
specific symbols that exclude those who do not share in their mean-
ings."s'
2. Modem Interpretations of Civil Religion
Although Bellah articulated civil religion as a political rather than
a sacral concept, modem scholars have interpreted contemporary
American civil religion as embodying varying degrees of traditional
sacral religion.9° These discrepancies are not trivial. The degree to
which scholars, and more importantly, the Supreme Court, under-
stand civil religion as a sacral concept drastically affects the categori-
zation of symbols and practices as religious or secular. For example,
some modem scholars argue that the concept of "God," albeit in what
they claim is a universal sense, is inherent in civil religion.91 This con-
struction of civil religion secularizes the word, if not the concept,
resulting in an invocation of God which ostensibly "does not threaten
the religious liberty contemplated by the Establishment Clause."9
Others draw the inference that the existence of civil religion nec-
essarily legitimizes commonly accepted practices that have their
foundations in sacral religions.93 A theory of civil religion that incor-
88 See Maddigan, supra note 71, at 325 ("Americans... embrace both the civil
religion and involvement in more traditional churches, seeing, for the most part, no
conflict between the two."); see also id. at 327 (distinguishing the "civil society" activities
of traditional religions, which are paralleled in civil religion, from the "theologically
religious" activities, which are not).
"9 Hepler, supra note 86, at 106. Examples of elements of Bellah's civil religion
include Memorial Day, the Fourth ofJuly, presidential birthdays, and the flag. See id.
at 97.
See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a National
"Religion" 39 MERCER L. REV. 495, 505 (1988) (asserting that civil religion, as under-
stood by the Court, is fundamentally a political interpretation of Christianity);
Maddigan, supra note 71, at 320-21 (emphasizing the significance of the Bible in
American civil religion).
91 See, e.g., Maddigan, supra note 71, at 322-28 (discussing the role of "God" in
America's public life); Marjorie A. Silver, Rethinking Religion and Public School Education,
15 QLR 213, 213 (1995) (describing the United States as "a nation founded on a tradi-
tion of a theistic civil religion").
9 Maddigan, supra note 71, at 326.
9" SeeJimmy Daniels, The First Amendment: Has the Supreme Court Overlooked Its Role
As Guardian of Our Freedom by Failing to Distinguish Between Real Threat and Mere Shadow?,
46 MERCER L. REV. 1167, 1185-87 (1995) (concluding that many practices rooted in
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porates elements of sacral religion, rather than maintaining an essen-
tially political character, affords great latitude for institutional secu-
larization of religion. In effect, it legitimizes government religious
practices by carving out a poorly defined sphere where religious prac-
tices are disguised as secular ones by the cloak of civil religion. Ac-
cording to this logic, "the Court should have recognized that the
Marsh prayers do not violate the First Amendment because they do
not involve theological religion at all. Instead, they exemplify Ameri-
can civil religion."94 If civil religion includes sacral religious concepts,
then government adoption and secularization of these concepts is
easily justified.
B. Civil Religion As a Legal Justification
for Secularization
The Supreme Court has never explicitly acknowledged the con-
cept of civil religion per se, but by stating that practices and symbols
have lost religious significance or are steeped in tradition and history,
the Court is relying on a nebulous incarnation of civil religion.95
Whether civil religion is defined as purely political or as influenced by
sacral religion is a significant distinction in the context of purely cul-
tural debate. Neither construction, however, justifies any reliance on
civil religion by the Supreme Court. The mere existence of civil relig-
ion as a social phenomenon does not mean that it should be sanc-
tioned by government institutions.
Advocates of the use of civil religion in Supreme Court adjudica-
tion support the measuring of challenged practices against acceptable
practices and symbols permitted by civil religion: "By recognizing the
phenomenon of civil religion in establishment clause adjudication,
courts can make better sense of existing public religion and avoid
undue and constitutionally illegitimate inferences from civil religion
to traditional, sacral religion."6 This view assumes that retaining pub-
lic religion is desirable-and that civil religion is an acceptable basis
for constitutional jurisprudence. Civil religion might suffice as a
Christianity do not endorse a particular faith because they are part of American civil
religion).
Maddigan, supra note 71, at 338.
95 See Hepler, supra note 86, at 108 (asserting that "[w]henever the Court acknowl-
edges that a religious practice is 'part of the fabric of society,' it is acknowledging what
sociologists call civil religion" (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792
(1983))).
Mirsky, supra note 71, at 1255.
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benchmark for adjudication if it was known beyond ivory towers and
unanimously understood as a political doctrine, rather than as a
vague and variously interpreted notion of a unification of religion,
social norms, and politics. However, because it is not widely under-
stood by legal scholars and is hotly contested, it is an inappropriate• 97
tool for constitutional adjudication.
Civil religion is a poor explanation for the Supreme Court's prac-
tice of secularization, and an inadequate justification for the policy.
While the academic exercise is merely unsatisfying, the practical ap-
plication of secularization has had unfortunate consequences. Poten-
tial justifications for secularization are rendered ineffectual in the
face of the actual and very damaging consequences of the practice.
IV. THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF SECULARIZATION
Secularization which derived from a legally sanctioned, albeit
nebulous, civil religion determined the outcome of Marsh, Lynch,
Allegheny, and Sherman, and it continues to influence church and state
doctrine. Although the Supreme Court's application of these con-
cepts has gone largely unnoticed by the general public, secularization
has severe consequences for religion, government, and the individual.
Constitutional scholar William Van Alstyne described this phenome-
non as
a movement from one national epigram to another;, it is the movement
from 'E Pluribus Unum' to 'In God We Trust,' from the ideal expressed
by our original Latin motto-one nation out of highly diverse but
equally welcome states and people-to an increasingly pressing enthusi-
asm in which government re-establishes itself under distinctly religious
auspices.98
This Part seeks to demonstrate that although characterization of relig-
ious practices and symbols as secular may preserve traditions that are
agreeable to a subset, or even a majority of the public, it threatens the
integrity of both religion and government, and ultimately marginal-
izes nonadherents.
See Hepler, supra note 86, at 113 ("Courts... should not borrow [civil religion]
from sociologists to bolster their reasoning when adjudicating First Amendment
cases.... By employing the concept of civil religion, courts give it legal significance,
which would encourage an Establishment Clause challenge to its existence.").
98 William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall--A
Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE LJ. 770, 771.
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A. Detriment to Religion
1. Government Encroachment on Religious Autonomy
In Everson, the Supreme Court articulated several critical func-
tions of the Establishment Clause. Among these, the preservation of
the integrity of religion was crucial. The Court stressed that "'[t]he
structure of our government has... secured religious liberty from the
invasion of the civil authority.'" The protection of religion from
state interference has been heralded as a great benefit of the religion
clauses since their inception. For example, after interviewing clergy
and members of many religious faiths, Alexis de Tocqueville noted
that "they mainly attributed the peaceful dominion of religion in
their country to the separation of Church and State."'o In order to
preserve this harmony, religion must be independent from even the
most benign influences of government, for if the state may aid or co-
opt religion, it may also regulate it."'
Classification by the Court does a great disservice to religion when
it pronounces that holidays or symbols of a given religious group are
secular. Characterizing a creche, which symbolizes the origins of
Christianity, as merely "engender[ing] a friendly community spirit of
good will in keeping with the season,"0 2 may constitute blasphemy for
faithful observers. s03 Similarly, although the Court in Marsh may have
considered its decision a means of preserving tradition, one scholar
has noted that "[i] t would, no doubt, come as a surprise to those who
offer legislative prayers that their efforts are constitutional only be-
cause the Court construes their words to be the functional equivalent
of the gavel used to bang a meeting to order." The Court dilutes or
9Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871)).
"o 1 ALEXIS DE TOcQUEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 313-14 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Colonial Press 1900) (1831), quoted in Robert S. Peck, The Threat to the American Idea of
Religious Liberty, 46 MERCERL. REv. 1123, 1136 (1995).
'0' See Everson, 330 U.S. at 27 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitu-
tion prohibits making public business out of religious activity).
'0 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
'0' Even those who might be perceived as beneficiaries of the Court's refusal to
eradicate Christian andJewish traditions from the civic sphere recognize the problems
inherent in such an approach. See, e.g., James M. Dunn, Neutrality and the Establishment
Clause, in EQUAL SEPARATION: UNDERSTANDING THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 55, 60 (PaulJ. Weber ed., 1990) (quoting the Reverend Billy Graham as
saying, "[t]o tie the Gospel to any political system, secular program, or society is wrong
and will only serve to divert the Gospel").
'" Hall, supra note 13, at 63.
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entirely negates religious import, simultaneously insulting religion
and imposing a watered-down version of religion on the general
population.0 5
Not surprisingly, the response to this type of judicial seculariza-
tion has not been uniformly positive.1' 6 Justice Blackmun's plurality
opinion in Allegheny describing the menorah as "simply a recognition
of cultural diversity" 17 was not well received by many Jews.'0 s Com-
mentators also expressed regret at the secularization of Chanukah:
"[H]aving found or created a sufficiently secular Christmas so that
municipalities can do what they please .... they apply the same pro-
cedure to Chanukah.... But I dissent from the depths of my soul....
I want to keep my holidays full of holiness ... ."109 One rabbi de-
scribed a display permitted by Allegheny as "'an outrage....
[Hanukkah] is a religious holiday and by putting a menorah on pub-
lic property we secularize Hanukkah.'""0 By commenting on the
authenticity and religiousness of symbols and practices, the Court
interferes with the autonomy of religion, injuring the sanctity of relig-
ion and offending its members.
2. Spiritual Pollution and the Violation of Voluntarism
Judicial secularization of religious practices and symbols may of-
fend religions which embrace tenets contrary to those embodied in
the religion co-opted by the state. In order to avoid "spiritual pollu-
tion,""' religious groups outside the mainstream, as interpreted by
the majority, must divorce themselves from the general citizenry.
Madison claimed that state support for Christianity would effectively
105 See Hepler, supra note 86, at 94 (discussing the generality of American civil
religion as a threat to traditional churches).
'06 See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 6, at A15 (describing the Court's practice of de-
termining the religiousness of challenged practices as "misguided substitution of
assigned roles-jurist as spiritual mentor, legislator as itinerant preacher").
107 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 619 (1989) (plurality opinion).
'03 See, e.g.,Jill Laurie Goodman, Creches, Menorahs, and the Courts, TIKKUN, Jan.-Feb.
1995, at 30, 30, available in 1995 WL 12580278 (noting that "because constitutional
justifications for government-supported displays of religious imagery are found too
often only by diminishing religion itself, people of faith ... lose most").
0 Id. at 85.
"o Bill Lindelof, Capitol Menorah Stirs Pride, Protest, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 27,
1994, at B1 (quoting Rabbi Lester Frazin).
". Hall, supra note 13, at 80.
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"banish our Citizens. Therefore, when judicial secularization oc-
curs, it promotes the exclusion of those with conflicting beliefs. For
instance, under Sherman,"1 a nonadhering student would be forced to
assert actively her minority status and remove herself from the class-
room in order to avoid participation in swearing an oath to a deity
other than her own. Children and adults confronting such a choice
are forced to define themselves in opposition to their peers, and are
similarly required to define themselves religiously, which may not
comport with their personal identity. Although an individual may be
an atheist and thus uncomfortable professing allegiance to God, that
individual's atheism may not be the characteristic by which she
chooses to assert her identity to others. Though her atheism may be
fundamental, it may also be quite personal.
In other instances, separation in order to avoid spiritual pollution
may not be possible. In Lynch and Allegheny, members of conflicting
religions could avoid such pollution only by avoiding the public
spaces where the crches and menorah were located.14 Furthermore,
the very existence of state-sponsored religious invocations, however
sanitized by a declaration that they have "lost any true religious sig-
nificance,"115 pollutes the integrity of conflicting religions.
In addition to ostracizing groups with conflicting values, seculari-
zation establishes religion in general, and often the Jewish and Chris-
tian traditions, as the social norm. Under the guise of civic society,
creches, civic prayers, and the Pledge of Allegiance impute Christian
mores and distort the pure voluntarism of religion.
"'Voluntarism' ... mean [s] that religious societies are most genuine
when their supporters arise from responding hearts and minds unas-
sisted as well as undeterred by government."1 6 Religion performs its
"' Id. (quotingJAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE (1785), reprinted
in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLTICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES
MADISON 6, 11 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER]).
"' Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992)
(discussed supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text).
14 Although it is possible that a nonadherent could raise a free exercise claim by
asserting that the displays interfered with her free exercise of religion, a court is likely
to hold that mere exposure does not constitute a government-inflicted burden. See,
e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Sch. Bd., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987) (denying
a free exercise claim when plaintiffs were not required to profess adherence or swear
allegiance to any tenet or deity).
"i Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 818 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
"6 Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom:
Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L REV. 581, 625 (1995) (arguing that one
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functions of offering existential answers, as well as a sense of comfort,
guidance, and community, only when an individual's adherence with
the tenets is genuine. Government sanctioning of religious ideas
effected by secularization distorts the genuineness of adherence: If
God is a social fact rather than a spiritual choice, the belief of mem-
bers may be a result of social conformance rather than individual
conviction.
Ironically, although the Court seems to be straining its logic in
order to preserve the inclusion of religious practices and symbols in
secular society, it is effectively compromising religion. By asserting
dominion over religion, the Court threatens the integrity of religion
and jeopardizes the participation of religious groups in society,
thereby disturbing the essential voluntarism of religious adherence.
In spite of its benign intentions, the Court's jurisprudence treads
heavily on the sanctity of religion.
B. Detriment to Society
Although secularization is often characterized as an "acknowl-
edgment" of religion,17 putting the machinery of the state behind
religion inevitably amounts to more than a mere "acknowledgment."
Incorporation of religious icons into civic culture suggests that the
government endorses the particular religion invoked. Furthermore,
because secularized practices are most frequently those derived from
Christianity, secularization privileges religion over irreligion, and
Christianity over all. This consequence contributes to religious divi-
siveness, violating the fundamental principles behind the religion
clauses."8
of the principle justifications for separationism is the desire to preserve the voluntary
nature of citizens' religious choices).
117 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677 (1984) (describing government
declaration of a national day of prayer and Presidential Proclamations in honor of
religious holy days as "acknowledgment"); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (characterizing
invocation of divine guidance on a public body as "a tolerable acknowledgment of
beliefs widely held among the people of this country").
"8 Cf MADISON, supra note 112, reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note
112, at 11 (condemning the Virginia Assessment Bill because it "will destroy that mod-
eration and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion,
has produced amongst its several sects").
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1. The Myth of Mere Acknowledgment
The crches in Lynch and Allegheny and the frequent invocation of
"God" in our mottoes and the Pledge have been deemed constitu-
tional by the Court because they are classified not as establishments of
religion, but as mere acknowledgments of a religiousness which has
merged with our broader historical tradition. In Marsh, the Court
upheld the legislative prayer because "it is simply a tolerable acknowl-
edgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."119
Earlier, Justice Brennan, who dissented in Marsh, argued that invoca-
tions of God are not truly religious, but are mere references to our
historical origins 20 According to this logic, "'One nation under God'
becomes 'one nation that formerly deemed itself to be governed by
overruling Providence.'"'
2
In spite of the Supreme Court's attempts to secularize religious
practices and symbols by pronouncing them devoid of religious sig-
nificance, it is clear that this logic fails in application. Instead of
eliminating religion from the particular practice or symbol, the Court
succeeds only in incorporating the religious sentiment into govern-
ment. For instance, the Court's assertion in Lynch that the crche was
secular does not render it neutral in any sense; the crche is no less
Christian than it was before the Court's opinion.'2 What may, to the
members of the Court, be an innocent acknowledgment of religion
may appear to individuals and religious groups as an official prefer-
ence for one religion over all others.'2 By officially incorporating
elements of any single religion into civic culture, the government
upsets the organic relationships existing among religious communi-
ties. Furthermore, the fact that the beliefs acknowledged are "widely
held"1'2 does not alleviate the tensions forged by such governmental
"9 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
120 See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("The reference to divinity in the revised pledge of alle-
giance, for example, may merely recognize the historical fact that our Nation was
believed to have been founded 'under God.'").
121 Hall, supra note 13, at 58.
12 See Dolgin, supra note 90, at 505 (arguing that the creche "[s] till evok[es] cen-
turies of Christian symbolism").
'2 See Hall, supra note 13, at 59 ("Government acknowledgment of particular
religious beliefs-no matter how widely held-without a corresponding acknowledg-
ment of alternative beliefs constitutes preferential treatment of the former over the
latter.").
124 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
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sanction.'25 Such acknowledgments naturalize majority religions,
further marginalizing the spiritual ideals--or the absence of spiritual
ideals-of the minority. Government necessarily privileges religion
when it adopts its language or symbols, even those that are common
to many sects.
2. Privileging Religions and Fomenting Divisiveness
The empowerment of religion, which necessarily results from
government adoption of it under the guise of secularization, is de-
structive to the balance of religious and civic life, as well as to the
relationships of religious groups to one another. Such implicit en-
dorsements result in religious divisiveness and jeopardize the truly
common culture that unites adherents of all religious sects and
nonadherents1
26
The threat posed to the integrity of religion similarly jeopardizes
the cohesiveness of society. Individuals and religious groups are
forced to isolate themselves, either by exempting themselves from
secularized practices such as the Pledge or by withdrawing from civic
functions to avoid spiritual pollution. Thus, secularization injures the
civil community by forcing religious groups to choose between their
religious and civil allegiances. 27 Civil community suffers when sub-
groups insulate themselves; for when they do, "they no longer partici-
pate in the republican discourse concerning the common good....
and they may be more likely to doubt the legitimacy of law itself."1
2
The secularization of religion compels religious groups either to
harmonize their own religious beliefs with those adopted by civic cul-
ture, or to reject civic culture and its requisite responsibilities in favor
of religious purity. Supporters of the Court's secularization analysis
would no doubt argue that exorcising religion from civic life com-
2 See Hall, supra note 13, at 59 ("When government acknowledges the beliefs of a
majority, the majority itself-operating through the governmental body-calls public
attention to its own religious beliefs. These acknowledgments .... are assertions of
power and dominion." (citation omitted)).
'2 See Hepler, supra note 86, at 93-94 (describing an American "civil religion" that
cuts across minority group lines).
1 See William P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISsUES 385, 399 (1996) ("Disallowing one religion from gaining political advan-
tage therefore may also have the additional salutary effect of preventing religiously-
motivated political confrontations from escalating.").
128 Hall, supra note 13, at 81 (footnotes omitted); see also id. (arguing that when
religious minorities "exclude themselves from the public square," political discourse is
impoverished and the danger of majority tyranny is increased).
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pletely would be divisive as well, as it would encourage some religious
individuals and groups to withdraw from the civic community. Such a
result is clearly undesirable, but the complete separation of religious
and civil life would be preferable to secularization because, at the very
least, it would be sect-neutral. In addition, it would allow dissenters to
maintain a distinction between their public and religious affiliations,
a distinction which protesting individuals and groups are not permit-
ted under the current scheme.
The sectarian nature of secularization exacerbates divisiveness.
Secularization is selectively employed, and it reflects the experience
and traditions of the majority. It affirms "the absorption of 'Christian
ethnocentrism' into public institutions, and a 'ceremonial deism' that
links democratic ideals and institutions to transcendent aspira-
tions."' ' Indeed, the Court has sanctioned the secularization of only
Jewish and Christian symbols and practices. The Court asserts that it
is merely recognizing historical traditions which incidentally refer-
ence Jewish and Christian ideals,3 0 but even a seemingly innocuous
acknowledgment of Jewish or Christian culture constitutes govern-
ment identification of these religions with American national culture.
By consistently celebrating Jewish and Christian traditions, even in a
nominally secular fashion, the Court is supporting a sectarian con-
struction which integrates certain religions into American culture.'
3 '
By holding that the creche in Lynch was not truly religious, "the Court
supports the construction of a putatively civil religion founded in
Christian symbolism and backed by the state.'0
2
This type of preference for sects, or for religion per se, foments
divisiveness among sects and reiterates the force of religion in estab-
lishing political standing in the community.3 3 Religion scholar Ira
'2 Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1651-52
(1987) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (footnotes omitted) (quoting respectively
Van Alstyne, supra note 98, at 786; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984)
(Brennan,J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted)).
'" See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 617 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion) (concluding that when coupled with a Christmas tree, a menorah merely symbol-
izes the celebration of the "winter-holiday season"); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 (noting that
there are "legitimate secular purposes" for a city's display of a creche).
' See Dolgin, supra note 90, at 502-03 ("The majority opinion in Lynch invokes a
set of American myths, reifies them, and then uses them to construct a civil religion
that becomes isomorphic with the celebration of Christianity.").
,32 Id. at 505.
'3 See Marshall, supra note 127, at 399 ("When the benefits and power of govern-
ment are seen as off-limits to competing religious groups, the danger of religious
divisiveness and factionalism subsides.").
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Lupu warns that "[h]istory provides us with abundant lessons of the
unique dangers of encouraging sectarian competition .... State crea-
tion of explicitly sectarian benefits may foster resentment among
sects, which in turn may aggravate preexisting and potentially de-
structive social divisions."M
C. Detriment to the Individual
In addition to its effects on religion and society, secularization is
severely detrimental to individuals. The Supreme Courtjustifies secu-
larization by making sweeping and inaccurate assumptions about
public interpretation and civil identification. Furthermore, the Court
fails to confront the implications of exclusivity in its dubious notions
of secularization. Supporters of the Court's secularization are not
troubled because they fail to perceive how these practices injure indi-
viduals.
135
1. Minority Interpretation of Secularization
The validity of secularization, as professed by the Court, relies on
significant assumptions. In particular, the Court presupposes that it
is possible for a religious practice or symbol to lose its religious mean-
ing. The Court further assumes the loss to be generally understood
within the relevant community. Given the disagreement among
judges and legal scholars concerning the validity of this presump-
1,36tion, it is disconcerting that the Court would assume that citizens
would be prepared to accept this leap of logic.
' Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion
Clauses, 7J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 367-68 (1996).
l5 See JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 154 (1995) (noting that the Court cor-
rectly decided Lynch because "[n]o one was compelled or meaningfully influenced to
do anything in respect to their religious beliefs, and to the extent that tax funds were
used at present, the amount seems to have been de minimis").
'6 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 643 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting in part) ("The menorah is indisputably a religious symbol, used ritually in a
celebration that has deep religious significance."); Sherman v. Community Consol.
Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion, J., concurring) ("[A] court
cannot deem any words to lose their meaning over the passage of time."); Dolgin,
supra note 90, at 504 (arguing that "outside the fanciful world of the Lynch decision,
the creche remains a central embodiment of Christian theology"); Steven B. Epstein,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2165 (1996)
("[U]nder any honest appraisal of modem American society, the practices constitut-
ing ceremonial deism have not lost their religious significance.").
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In recent cases, the Supreme Court has determined whether secu-
larization has been achieved by evaluating the practice or symbol in
question under the endorsement test. The test asks whether a rea-
sonable observer would perceive the practice or symbol as a govern-
ment endorsement of religionles With regard to the creche in Lynch
and the menorah in Allegheny, the Justices applying the endorsement
test determined that a reasonable observer would not perceive these
symbols as representing a government endorsement of religion. 9
This result is puzzling, for it requires that the reasonable observer be
well versed in American culture and history, and at least somewhat
familiar with church and state doctrine. Yet, without at least a mini-
mal degree of familiarity with the Establishment Clause, it seems im-
plausible that the average citizen would interpret a government-
sponsored creche as anything but an endorsement of religion. It is
doubtful that much of the current American population fits the pro-
file of the Court's reasonable observer, and we can be certain that
those unfamiliar with American culture do not. Constitutional law
scholar William Van Alstyne notes this incongruity: "Late arrivals to
America may suppose they can take the government's religiosity or
leave it, but they are stuck with the reality that... [o]urs is basically a
Christian-pretending government where they will be made to feel
ungrateful should they complain." 40
The Court is optimistic when it assumes that there is any single
and predictable way of interpreting symbols. One religion scholar
suggests that:
's' See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592 (stating that "[ifn recent years, we have paid
particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either
has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion" (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
436 (1962))); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that an Establishment Clause violation is present when government
endorses or disapproves of a religion or becomes entangled with a religious institu-
tion).
' See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion) (holding that the Establishment
Clause is violated when "'the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be
perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by
the nonadherents as a disapproval of their individual religious choices'" (quoting
School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)));Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The display celebrates a public holiday, and no one
contends that declaration of that holiday is understood to be an endorsement of
religion.").
'" See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620-21 (plurality opinion) (holding that an observer
could not reasonably infer that the presentation of a menorah in this case represented
an endorsement of religion); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
140 Van Alstyne, supra note 98, at 787.
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No symbol, religious or otherwise, has one meaning for everyone. The
definition a person selects from available meanings depends on the use
of the symbol for that person at a particular time and place.... [A]
symbol with religious meanings may bear some of those meanings for
some people, even if used in a nonreligious context ....1
In order to understand that a creche on government property is not
an endorsement of Christianity, a reasonable observer must regard
Christmas as a secular holiday. This is not an obvious interpretation.
Christmas is, in fact, a day to commemorate the birth ofJesus Christ,
the Christian Savior. Furthermore, the Court's reasonable observer
in both of these situations would have to discern that accommodation1 142
of religion is distinct from endorsement. Under these circum-
stances, the Establishment Clause actively protects only those who
resemble the Court's construction of a reasonable observer. This
limitation cripples the Clause by compromising minority interests.
Individuals who do not resemble the Court's imagined reasonable
observer are denied the consideration that they deserve, the same
protection afforded to mainstream citizens.
There is extensive evidence that the Court's construction of the
reasonable observer is insufficient to protect the interests of minori-
des.143 For instance, in Lynch, substantial evidence was offered to in-
dicate that religious minorities understood the criche as a symbol of
Christianity. These religious minorities were not persuaded by the
surrounding holiday paraphernalia that the creche was merely part of
a secular celebration.'4 One commentator observed that "the fact
that [the creche] ... is part of a wider secular celebration.., does
not dilute the inevitable impression that the government is endorsing
the beliefs associated with the creche."45 Similarly, it is at least plau-
sible, if not probable, that a person uttering the Pledge of Allegiance
141 Dolgin, supra note 90, at 497-98 (footnotes omitted).
14' The Court has held that accommodation of religion is a valid secular purpose
satisfying the first prong of the Lemon test. See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338
(1987) ("[T]here is ample room for accommodation of religion under the Establish-
ment Clause."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (holding that the release
of students from school for religious instruction is a valid accommodation of religion
and does not violate the Establishment Clause).
143 Furthermore, it does not account for the multitudes who may not be consid-
ered "reasonable" by the Court and are therefore rendered outsiders.
144 See Developments in the Law, supra note 129, at 1657 & n.85 (referring to the
testimony of a child psychologist in Lynch concerning the effects of Christian symbols
like the creche on non-Christian children).
14 Id. at 1657.
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for the first time would reasonably conclude that the government
endorses allegiance to a religious deity.46 As conceived, the Court's
test is optimistic and, indeed, misguided in its application, eviscerat-
ing the Establishment Clause by limiting its applicability.
2. Denying Full Citizenship
Secularization sacrifices minority interests in order to preserve
agreeable traditions. This compromise brings with it a prohibitively
high cost for a democratic and ostensibly pluralistic society. By as-
suming that secularization is commonly understood as an acknowl-
edgment of religion for the sake of tradition, rather than an
endorsement of particular religious ideals,'47 the Court is effectively
denying full citizenship to nonadherents.' 4 1 Madison recognized this
danger when he wrote his Memorial and Remonstrance against the Vir-
ginia Assessment Bill, expressing his concern that the Bill "degrades
from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion
do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.' 49 Indeed, a fun-
damental purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect citizens
who do not adhere to the majority religious beliefs. Although it is
often argued that the Clause exists merely to prevent actual state sup-
port of a particular religion to the exclusion of another,'50 it is clear
"4 The reasonable observer standard is particularly problematic in this context.
The Pledge of Allegiance is frequently recited in schools, and it is unlikely that young
children have the requisite experience with American culture to satisfy the reasonable
observer test. In addition, the Pledge and other mottoes are often communicated to
new immigrants, who certainly do not fit comfortably within the Court's construction
of a reasonable observer but who nonetheless merit the protection of the Bill of
Rights.
7 See supra Part II (questioning the coherence of the secularization approach).
148 See Hall, supra note 13, at 80-81 (arguing that civic religious activities may
"coerce citizens to deny their citizenship rather than submit to an unholy spiritual
fellowship").
14' MADISON, supra note 112, reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note
112, at 10-11.
, 0 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(interpreting the Framers' intent when creating the First Amendment as "designed to
prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimina-
tion among sects"); cf Andrew Rotstein, Note, Good Faith? Religious-Secular Parallelism
and the Establishment Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1763, 1795-96 (1993) ("So long as there
is no endorsement of religion qua religion, and no implication that the benevolent
acknowledgment of one religion's universal message in any way excludes or demeans
the messages of other religions or the beliefs of nonreligious persons, there seems no
reasonable ground for the objective observer to feel relegated to the role of an out-
sider or one of inferior political status or otherwise feel coerced or offended."
(footnote omitted)).
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that secularization forces outsiders to recognize and often assert their
status as outsiders. The Court, however, ends its inquiry after con-
cluding that a given practice is simply no longer religious. As attrac-
tive as this analysis may be to those committed to preserving public
invocations, it effectively deprives dissenting individuals of their un-
tainted claim to citizenship.
The consequences of secularization are detrimental, and its prac-
tical effect poses an ironic compromise: The very declaration that a
practice or symbol has lost its religious significance insults religion by
depriving it of its inherent holiness.'5' Yet it also alienates outsiders
insofar as such declarations are ineffective. Religion is injured by
government encroachment and spiritual pollution, and, notwith-
standing the Supreme Court's attempts to neutralize the religiousness
of secularized practices and symbols, society and individuals are in-
jured by perceptions that the government is privileging religion,
thereby denying full citizenship to those outside the mainstream. In
this sense, both the winners and the losers suffer, raising the question
of why the courts perform such logical gymnastics in order to pre-
serve these traditions.
V. SECULARIZATION AND THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN IDENTITY
Assessing the damage of Supreme Court secularization of relig-
ious symbols and practices presents puzzling questions. If the conse-
quences of secularization are so severe, why does the Court persist?
Why does secularization not meet greater opposition? In this Part of
the Comment, I argue that the pursuit of secularization analysis is a
desperate and misguided attempt to preserve a particular construc-
tion of American identity that is based largely on the Christian and
Jewish traditions. Secularization facilitates a myth of collective
American identity which relies on religion in general, and Christian
and Jewish traditions in particular, to buttress that construction. The
secularization analysis is both an inadequate and a wholly inappropri-
ate means of achieving the questionable goal of curing our national
identity crisis.
'-1 See supra Part IV.A (describing the harms that secularization inflicts on relig-
ion).
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A. Collective Identity Crisis
The notion articulated by Justice Douglas that "[w] e are a relig-
ious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,"12 of-
fered as justification for Supreme Court doctrine, 3 reveals the depth
of investment in religion as a defining characteristic of our national
identity. The statement does not merely indicate that many Ameri-
cans are religious, or that religion is central in the lives of some indi-
viduals-rather, it defines America collectively as a religious body.
Yet the correlation between a nation composed of religious individu-
als and a "religious people" is not obvious. In the same way that the
fact that eighty percent of Americans are Caucasian'5 does not make
us a "white people," the prevalence of religious affiliation does not
necessarily make us a "religious people." It is clear, however, that this
vision of an American identity based largely on religion has broad
support.- The prevalence of this view alone, however, does not sug-
gest any convincing explanation for its continued existence.
The investment in religion as a pillar of our national identity is
evident even in the language adopted by those who criticize the Su-
preme Court's secularization analysis. Even scholars who criticize the
present Supreme Court methodology frequently suggest alternative
'1 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). The Court in Zorach used this
claim to uphold the constitutionality of a program that allowed public schools to
release students during school time for private religious instruction off-site. To do
otherwise, the Court said, would be to "read into the Bill of Rights ... a philosophy of
hostility to religion." Id. at 315.
1s This phrase has been cited in a number of other Supreme Court and lower
court opinions. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 554
(1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675 (1984); Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 395 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 563 (1961) (Douglas,J., dissenting).
154 See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1997, at 379 (Robert Famighetti
ed., 1996).
155 See, e.g., ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 82 (1990) ("American culture can ... be seen as a tapestry, with
religion as its warp threads."); Dolgin, supra note 90, at 516 (interpreting the Supreme
Court's decision in Lynch as based on the proposition that "Christianity and the
American nation become one"); Maddigan, supra note 71, at 326 (asserting that
American identity is dependent "on some notions that happen to overlap with tradi-
tional religion," and predicting that "[u]ndermining these notions would actually
undermine the identity of the entire society, whose members-including atheists-
depend on these collective norms to remain connected with the whole"); M.G. "Pat"
Robertson, Religion in the Classroom, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 601 (1995)
(describing Justice Douglas's characterization as "the best summation of our religious
history").
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analyses that will save such practices,' revealing their own investment
in the myth of a religious identity. Advocates of civil religion and its
preservation in public life acknowledge that "public religion 'feels
funny,' constitutionally speaking, and is not readily understandable or
justifiable in the terms through which the establishment clause is
generally understood." 57 As a remedy, those same critics suggest
overt reliance on civil religion as a justification for practices and sym-
bols that otherwise would be unconstitutional."8 Absent a deep in-
vestment in the notion of a "religious people," it is not clear why the
Court should engage in contortions of logic tojustify the inclusion of
religion in public life. What would be lost by applying a more
straightforward interpretation of the Establishment Clause?
One plausible explanation for the continued efforts to maintain
religion's privileged position in American identity arises from the
common association of religion with morality.159 Many commentators
advocate retention of religion in public life because they regard relig-
ion as a bastion of morality, and they fear the demise of morality in
contemporary culture:
[W]ithout religious principle to guide them, people will tend to be im-
moral and careless about marital obligations. They will, if it suits their
interests, lie, cheat, steal, commit violent acts, and abuse drugs and al-
cohol. Guards and metal detectors, more prisons, and expanded death
sentences will not deter them in the absence of religious principle.
16
0
156 See, e.g., Maddigan, supra note 71, at 345-46 (arguing that civil religion provides
a theoretical framework for justifying public prayer and the words"under God" in the
Pledge and "In God We Trust" on coins); Mirsky, supra note 71, at 1255 (suggesting a
means by which "judicial sensibility... could respond creatively to the constitutional
vagaries of public religion"); cf. Rotstein, supra note 150, at 1795-96 (suggesting an
"objective observer" approach).
157 Mirsky, supra note 71, at 1239.
' See, e.g., Maddigan, supra note 71, at 346 (advocating the concept of civil relig-
ion to "justify longstanding cultural practices that.., might be found unconstitu-
tional"); Mirsky, supra note 71, at 1255 (suggesting that the Court employ civil religion
to "shape the more troubling manifestations of civil religion into a more constitution-
ally palatable form").
159 See, e.g., Maddigan, supra note 71, at 327 ("To refuse to permit the government
to help promote basic values-like honesty, hard work, and mutual care-on which
democracy depends merely because these values are also embraced by theological
religions is hardly desirable."); Robertson, supra note 155, at 597 (citing George
Washington for the proposition that "reason and experience forbid us to expect pub-
lic morality in the absence of religious principle"); Rotstein, supra note 150, at 1805
("American public values, as reflected in the Constitution itself, are not entirely dis-
tinguishable from fundamental moral concerns that religion also addresses.").
'60 Robertson, supra note 155, at 597.
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Yet even if such despairing predictions are not entirely unreasonable,
panic about the health of our collective moral soul does not justify
manipulating our constitutional jurisprudence to assuage the fears of
a few.!' Although it is true that tenets of many religions coincide with
basic notions of morality, and religion may be a useful vehicle for
promoting these notions, asserting that morality will vanish from so-
ciety in the absence of a strong identification of Americans as
"religious people" is simply wrong. It is also offensive to ethical and
moral atheists. Furthermore, when compared with alternative means
of inculcating morality, secularization of religion bears a much higher
CoSt.
162
The subtext of the language employed by advocates of civil relig-
ion and supporters of the Court's secularization practice reveals a
fundamental concern for the American identity. The need to rede-
fine criches as secular and to preserve God in our national pledge
and in our legislatures seems to be motivated by a collective identity
crisis. Proponents accurately note that religion has been an impor-
tant element in the development of American culture.) It is not
clear, however, how a government without this secularized religious
influence will, as one supporter of the Court's jurisprudence argues,
be "debilitating in the sense that a government that scrupulously
avoids any hint of transcendent, ultimate, or even visionary goals or
values in its statecraft tends to become an antiseptic technoc-
racy... with no role in fostering the civic or moral development of
161 Although some legal scholars advocate formal adoption by the Court of a civil
religion in order to justify secularization and preserve public religion, others cham-
pion an amendment to the Constitution specifically preserving such public religion as
prayer in public schools. See, e.g., Harlan A. Loeb & Debbie N. Kaminer, God, Money
and Schools: Voucher Programs Impugn the Separation of Church and Stat4 30J. MARHSALL
L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (noting that both the Christian Coalition and Focus on the Family
have proposed constitutional amendments allowing prayer in school). An amend-
ment, subject to the legislative process and ratification by the states, is more palatable
than judicial maneuvering intended to redefine nativity scenes as "national" or
.secular" symbols.
162 See Kaufman, supra note 6, at A15 ("Pathetically, laws establishing religious
parameters of conduct may become the new moral surrogate for some families in the
1990s. Exactly what may come of this misguided substitution of assigned roles-jurist
as spiritual mentor, legislator as itinerant preacher-is yet unknown.").
163 See, e.g., Maddigan, supra note 71, at 316-17 (asserting that "religion has always
played a prominent role in American civil society"); Mirsky, supra note 71, at 1240
(describing religion as a "meaningful element of American life"); Robertson, supra
note 155, at 601 ("Vestiges of our religious history still live in the public life of Amer-
ica.").
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the individual."4 The "essential" union of religion and state is not at
all clear. Supporters often fail to justify the contortions of constitu-
tional jurisprudence in the name of preserving the religious elements
they understand as fundamental to national identity. Furthermore,
supporters of secularization and the preservation of public religion
refuse to divorce the past from the present; the boundaries between
religion and the secular have shifted over time with the dramatic evo-
lution of the nation's demographic composition.65 Although Chris-
tian traditions may have harmonized with the national identity of the
late eighteenth century, no sectarian representation, indeed, no relig-
ious identification at all, is compatible with a conscientious expres-
sion of a contemporary national identity.J
B. Proposing an Alternative
When examined in light of the serious consequences of seculari-
zation, the justification for maintaining religion in public life as a
means of preserving a particular construction of American identity
cannot be sustained. Such a rationale is not sufficiently strong to
outweigh the need for rigorous legal analysis. The Supreme Court
should, therefore, undertake an approach both simple and radical: It
should abandon its policy of secularizing religious practices and sym-
bols and return to the Establishment Clause analysis which it em-
ployed in its earliest cases. Such a proposal requires only that the
Court return to the principles and methodologies established in the
earliest incarnations of church and state doctrine,/s though the pro-
posal would achieve dramatic results. By abandoning secularization
analysis, the Court would no longer be able to recharacterize religious
1A Rotstein, supra note 150, at 1802.
' For example, Islam recently surpassed Judaism as the second largest faith in the
United States. See Epstein, supra note 136, at 2084 n.1 (citing Sylvester Monroe, The
Fruits of Islam: Muslim Faith Grows in Followers and Respect, EMERGE, Mar. 1994, at 38,
40).41 In the early years of the nation's existence, religion, especially Christianity, may
have fit harmoniously at the center of the population's identity. See CURRY, supra note
73, at 218 (arguing that in the late eighteenth century, "Protestant Christianity and
American culture intertwined"). Furthermore, because many settlers had left Europe
to escape religious oppression, it seems natural that religion was a defining character-
istic of their collective identity.
167 For example, the modern Court should look to the majority decision in School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1963). In that case the
Court adhered to the interpretation of the Establishment Clause articulated in Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), and struck down local school prayer initiatives
despite their popularity.
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practices and symbols as secular, and therefore, these contested prac-
tices and symbols would be expelled from public life.
Faithful application of the Establishment Clause could be
achieved by rigorous application of tests currently used by the Su-
preme Court. For example, if the Court evaluated the facts of Alle-
gheny in accordance with the endorsement test, but in the absence of
secularization, both the nativity creche and the menorah would have
been held unconstitutional. The first prong, which requires an
examination of whether the displays have a valid secular purpose,1 69 is
satisfied under the Court's actual analysis and under the proposed
analysis. '70 The second prong is an inquiry into the effects of the
practice: Does the presence of the creche or the menorah have the
effect of conveying a government endorsement of religion? 1 7  The
holdings in the actual opinion relied on an assessment of whether, in
the context of each display, the symbols were truly religious, or
whether their surroundings had transformed them into secular ob-
jects. Hence, the creche, which stood alone, was religious and vio-
lated the effects prong because it could be reasonably interpreted as
an endorsement of religion.'" The menorah, however, was sur-
rounded by other holiday paraphernalia, and therefore could not be
reasonably perceived as government endorsement of religion.'17 Ac-
cording to the Court's opinion, context had somehow neutralized the
religiousness of the objects. However, if evaluated according to the
proposed analysis, both displays would be examined in accordance
with their original, religious connotations, not as interpreted by a
modern Court's fictitious reasonable observer, and unmitigated by
holiday traditions. This approach is somewhat of a lowest-common-
denominator analysis: It strips the practices and objects to their es-
sential form and function, as naturally understood by an uninformed
16 The endorsement test is one possible means of analyzing such cases. Other
tests employed by the Court, such as the Lemon test, would be adequate if applied in
the absence of secularization analysis. This suggests that while much controversy has
surrounded the appropriate test for adjudicating Establishment Clause claims, the
application of such tests is a more fundamental problem.
169 SeeLemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
'7o This prong is satisfied under the proposed analysis only because the Court has
consistently held that the practice in question must only demonstrate a plausible
secular purpose, not that the only conceivable purpose be secular. See, e.g., Wallace v.
Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (finding the purpose prong violated when the statute in
question "had no secular purpose").
17' See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989).
'72 See id. at 601-02.
1,5 See id. at 620 (plurality opinion).
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observer and devoid of implications and meanings ascribed to them
by the Supreme Court and legal scholars. In short, under the pro-
posed analysis, a creche is a Christian symbol commemorating the
birth of Christ; no philosophical or social reconstruction can or
should alter this essential symbolism.
Regardless of whether the Court analyzes challenged symbols and
practices under its traditional tests or an alternative inquiry, the pro-
posal requires more stringent scrutiny of the object or practice being
challenged. In addition to banning criches and menorahs from gov-
ernment-sponsored displays, the proposed analysis would also elimi-
nate national invocations of God in our mottoes and Pledge, and on
our currency. Religion would have to be absent from government-
sponsored events and activities. Although this result seems radical,
and indeed would have a profound effect, it would not deprive
American culture of all symbols and invocations; rather, it would re-
sult in an increased reliance on the symbols and practices that are
truly representative of our national identity, such as the flag, recitation
of the Pledge of Allegiance as it was initially conceived,'74 and invoca-
tions celebrating our rich secular history as a nation of individuals
united by an allegiance to democracy and freedom, not to God.
CONCLUSION
Secularization is an unfortunate means of attempting to maintain
the status quo. It is legally and analytically unsound and, perhaps
more important, it has harmful consequences. Regardless of the myr-
iad ways in which the practice is recast by scholars as a legitimate in-
corporation of civil religion, secularization extracts a high cost from
religion, society, and individuals.
Repudiation of Supreme Court sanctioning of public religion
through its practice of secularization is a radical proposal; without the
logic of secularization, the Court would be unable to preserve many
public religious traditions. Although a rigorous application of Estab-
lishment Clause analysis would eradicate cr~ches from our public
squares and "God" from our national mottoes, pledges, and invoca-
tions, it would return church and state jurisprudence to an acceptable
level ofjudicial integrity. Furthermore, elimination of Court seculari-
... The original Pledge of Allegiance did not include the phrase "under God" and
merely affirmed allegiance to "one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."
The invocation to God was added in the 1950s. See ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO
PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 570-71 (1964).
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zation would allow religion to subsist without either assistance or in-
terference from government, and more importantly, would grant full
enjoyment of citizenship to all, regardless of any religious affiliation.
* * * * * *
